How this differs from what you already have

Your mail already has several protections. Here is exactly what each one does, and the gap this fills.

SPF, DKIM and DMARC

Your provider almost certainly uses these already. They check that a message came from a server the domain owner authorised, and that the domain's own signature is intact.

What they do well: stop a stranger sending mail that claims to come from @yourbank.com at all. This is genuinely valuable and is why outright domain spoofing is much rarer than it was.

What they cannot do:

Where this fits: alongside them, not instead. They authenticate the domain; this authenticates the person and the text.

PGP and S/MIME

Both do something close to what this does: sign and encrypt mail with a personal key. They are older, standardised, and — for most people — unusable.

PGP / S/MIMEProtectMyMail
How you get a keyGenerate one, then get it signed or boughtCreated on install, in seconds
How others find your keyKey servers, or you send it to themPublished to the network automatically
How the key is tied to your addressA web of trust, or a paid certificateA code mailed to the mailbox and returned
What a reader sees when it failsOften nothing, or a technical errorOne sentence saying what was established
Independently auditedYes, extensivelyNo

The honest comparison: PGP and S/MIME are more mature and more scrutinised than this is. Their problem has never been the mathematics; it is that after thirty years, almost nobody uses them, because getting a key, distributing it and keeping it working is work most people will not do. This trades some of that maturity for something a person can actually finish setting up in ten minutes.

If you already run S/MIME successfully across your organisation, you have most of what this offers and you should keep it.

Spam filters

A spam filter asks "does this look like bulk unwanted mail". The frauds that cost money are none of those things: one message, well written, addressed to you personally, often from a genuine mailbox. Filters are good at what they do and structurally blind to this.

Secure portals and "click here to view your message"

Banks and hospitals often send a notification and keep the real message behind a login. That does protect the content, and it moves your correspondence into somebody else's system, adds a password to remember, and cannot be used by anyone who does not run the portal.

It also, unfortunately, trains people to click links in e-mails and log in — which is what phishing depends on.

End-to-end encrypted messengers

Signal and its like are stronger than any e-mail solution: they hide metadata better, they have forward secrecy, and they have been audited. If you can move a conversation there, do.

Most business correspondence cannot move. Invoices, contracts, orders and legal correspondence arrive by e-mail from parties who will not install anything. This is for that mail.

A summary

ThreatSPF/DKIM/DMARCSpam filterThis
Outright domain spoofingYesPartlyYes
Look-alike domainNoSometimesYes
Text altered in transitNoNoYes
Compromised real accountNoNoWarns on key change
Provider reading your mailNoNoYes, when encrypted
An unwise instructionNoNoNo

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